Two Dogmas of Empiricism

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Two Dogmas of Empiricism

Willard Van Orman Quine

Originally published in The Philosophical = Review=20 60 (1951): 20-43. Reprinted in W.V.O. Quine, From a = Logical Point=20 of View (Harvard University Press, 1953; second, revised, = edition=20 1961), with the following alterations: "The version printed here = diverges=20 from the original in footnotes and in other minor respects: =A7=A71 = and 6 have=20 been abridged where they encroach on the preceding essay, and = =A7=A73-4 have=20 been expanded at points."
Transcribed into hypertext by Andrew = Chrucky,=20 Sept. 12, 1997.

Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two = dogmas.=20 One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which = are=20 analytic, or grounded in meanings independently = of=20 matters of fact and truths which are synthetic, = or=20 grounded in fact. The other dogma is = reductionism: the=20 belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical=20 construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both = dogmas, I=20 shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as = we shall=20 see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative = metaphysics and=20 natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism. =

1. BACKGROUND FOR ANALYTICITY

Kant's cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths was = foreshadowed=20 in Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of = fact, and in=20 Leibniz's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. = Leibniz=20 spoke of the truths of reason as true in all possible worlds.=20 Picturesqueness aside, this is to say that the truths of reason are = those=20 which could not possibly be false. In the same vein we hear analytic = statements defined as statements whose denials are = self-contradictory. But=20 this definition has small explanatory value; for the notion of=20 self-contradictoriness, in the quite broad sense needed for this = definition=20 of analyticity, stands in exactly the same need of clarification as = does the=20 notion of analyticity itself.¹ The two notions are the two sides of a = single dubious=20 coin.

Kant conceived of an analytic statement as one that attributes = to its=20 subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the = subject. This=20 formulation has two shortcomings: it limits itself to statements of=20 subject-predicate form, and it appeals to a notion of containment = which is=20 left at a metaphorical level. But Kant's intent, evident more from = the use=20 he makes of the notion of analyticity than from his definition of = it, can be=20 restated thus: a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of = meanings=20 and independently of fact. Pursuing this line, let us examine the = concept of=20 meaning which is presupposed.

We must observe to begin with that meaning is not to be = identified=20 with naming or reference. Consider Frege's example of 'Evening Star' = and=20 'Morning Star.' Understood not merely as a recurrent evening = apparition but=20 as a body, the Evening Star is the planet Venus, and the Morning = Star is the=20 same. The two singular terms name the same thing. But the meanings = must be=20 treated as distinct, since the identity 'Evening Star =3D Morning = Star' is a=20 statement of fact established by astronomical observation. If = 'Evening Star'=20 and 'Morning Star' were alike in meaning, the identity 'Evening Star = =3D=20 Morning Star' would be analytic.

Again there is Russell's example of 'Scott' and 'the author of = Waverly.' Analysis of the meanings of words was by no means = sufficient to=20 reveal to George IV that the person named by these two singular = terms was=20 one and the same.

The distinction between meaning and naming is no less = important at the=20 level of abstract terms. The terms '9' and 'the number of planets' = name one=20 and the same abstract entity but presumably must be regarded as = unlike in=20 meaning; for astronomical observation was needed, and not mere = reflection on=20 meanings, to determine the sameness of the entity in question. =

Thus far we have been considering singular terms. With general = terms,=20 or predicates, the situation is somewhat different but parallel. = Whereas a=20 singular term purports to name an entity, abstract or concrete, a = general=20 term does not; but a general term is true of an = entity,=20 or of each of many, or of none. The class of all entities of which a = general=20 term is true is called the extension of the = term. Now=20 paralleling the contrast between the meaning of a singular term and = the=20 entity named, we must distinguish equally between the meaning of a = general=20 term and its extension. The general terms 'creature with a heart' = and=20 'creature with a kidney,' e.g., are perhaps alike in extension but = unlike in=20 meaning.

Confusion of meaning with extension, in the case of general = terms, is=20 less common than confusion of meaning with naming in the case of = singular=20 terms. It is indeed a commonplace in philosophy to oppose intention = (or=20 meaning) to extension, or, in a variant vocabulary, connotation to=20 denotation.

The Aristotelian notion of essence was the forerunner, no = doubt, of=20 the modern notion of intension or meaning. For Aristotle it was = essential in=20 men to be rational, accidental to be two-legged. But there is an = important=20 difference between this attitude and the doctrine of meaning. From = the=20 latter point of view it may indeed be conceded (if only for the sake = of=20 argument) that rationality is involved in the meaning of the word = 'man'=20 while two-leggedness is not; but two-leggedness may at the same time = be=20 viewed as involved in the meaning of 'biped' while rationality is = not. Thus=20 from the point of view of the doctrine of meaning it makes no sense = to say=20 of the actual individual, who is at once a man and a biped, that his = rationality is essential and his two-leggedness accidental or vice = versa.=20 Things had essences, for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms have = meanings.=20 Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object = of=20 reference and wedded to the word.

For the theory of meaning the most conspicuous question is as = to the=20 nature of its objects: what sort of things are meanings? They are = evidently=20 intended to be ideas, somehow -- mental ideas for some semanticists, = Platonic ideas for others. Objects of either sort are so elusive, = not to say=20 debatable, that there seems little hope of erecting a fruitful = science about=20 them. It is not even clear, granted meanings, when we have two and = when we=20 have one; it is not clear when linguistic forms should be regarded = as=20 synonymous, or alike in meaning, and when they = should=20 not. If a standard of synonymy should be arrived at, we may = reasonably=20 expect that the appeal to meanings as entities will not have played = a very=20 useful part in the enterprise.

A felt need for meant entities may derive from an earlier = failure to=20 appreciate that meaning and reference are distinct. Once the theory = of=20 meaning is sharply separated from the theory of reference, it is a = short=20 step to recognizing as the business of the theory of meaning simply = the=20 synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements; = meanings=20 themselves, as obscure intermediary entities, may well be abandoned. =

The description of analyticity as truth by virtue of meanings = started=20 us off in pursuit of a concept of meaning. But now we have abandoned = the=20 thought of any special realm of entities called meanings. So the = problem of=20 analyticity confronts us anew.

Statements which are analytic by general philosophical acclaim = are=20 not, indeed, far to seek. They fall into two classes. Those of the = first=20 class, which may be called logically true, are typified by:

(1) No unmarried man is married.

The relevant feature of this example is that it is not merely = true as=20 it stands, but remains true under any and all reinterpretations of = 'man' and=20 'married.' If we suppose a prior inventory of = logical=20 particles, comprising 'no,' 'un-' 'if,' 'then,' 'and,' etc., then in = general=20 a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under = all=20 reinterpretations of its components other than the logical = particles.=20

But there is also a second class of analytic statements, = typified by:=20

(2) No bachelor is married.

The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be = turned into a=20 logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms; thus (2)=20 can be turned into (1)=20 by putting 'unmarried man' for its synonym 'bachelor.' We still lack = a=20 proper characterization of this second class of analytic statements, = and=20 therewith of analyticity generally, inasmuch as we have had in the = above=20 description to lean on a notion of 'synonymy' which is no less in = need of=20 clarification than analyticity itself.

In recent years Carnap has tended to explain analyticity by = appeal to=20 what he calls state-descriptions.² A state-description is any exhaustive = assignment of=20 truth values to the atomic, or noncompound, statements of the = language. All=20 other statements of the language are, Carnap assumes, built up of = their=20 component clauses by means of the familiar logical devices, in such = a way=20 that the truth value of any complex statement is fixed for each=20 state-description by specifiable logical laws. A statement is then = explained=20 as analytic when it comes out true under every state-description. = This=20 account is an adaptation of Leibniz's "true in all possible worlds." = But=20 note that this version of analyticity serves its purpose only if the = atomic=20 statements of the language are, unlike 'John is a bachelor' and = 'John is=20 married,' mutually independent. Otherwise there would be a = state-description=20 which assigned truth to 'John is a bachelor' and falsity to 'John is = married,' and consequently 'All bachelors are married' would turn = out=20 synthetic rather than analytic under the proposed criterion. Thus = the=20 criterion of analyticity in terms of state-descriptions serves only = for=20 languages devoid of extralogical synonym-pairs, such as 'bachelor' = and=20 'unmarried man': synonym-pairs of the type which give rise to the = "second=20 class" of analytic statements. The criterion in terms of = state-descriptions=20 is a reconstruction at best of logical truth.

I do not mean to suggest that Carnap is under any illusions on = this=20 point. His simplified model language with its state-descriptions is = aimed=20 primarily not at the general problem of analyticity but at another = purpose,=20 the clarification of probability and induction. Our problem, = however, is=20 analyticity; and here the major difficulty lies not in the first = class of=20 analytic statements, the logical truths, but rather in the second = class,=20 which depends on the notion of synonymy.

II. DEFINITION

There are those who find it soothing to say that the analytic=20 statements of the second class reduce to those of the first class, = the=20 logical truths, by definition; 'bachelor,' for = example,=20 is defined as 'unmarried man.' But how do we = find that=20 'bachelor' is defined as 'unmarried man'? Who defined it thus, and = when? Are=20 we to appeal to the nearest dictionary, and accept the = lexicographer's=20 formulation as law? Clearly this would be to put the cart before the = horse.=20 The lexicographer is an empirical scientist, whose business is the = recording=20 of antecedent facts; and if he glosses 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man' = it is=20 because of his belief that there is a relation of synonymy between = these=20 forms, implicit in general or preferred usage prior to his own work. = The=20 notion of synonymy presupposed here has still to be clarified, = presumably in=20 terms relating to linguistic behavior. Certainly the "definition" = which is=20 the lexicographer's report of an observed synonymy cannot be taken = as the=20 ground of the synonymy.

Definition is not, indeed, an activity exclusively of = philologists.=20 Philosophers and scientists frequently have occasions to "define" a=20 recondite term by paraphrasing it into terms of a more familiar = vocabulary.=20 But ordinarily such a definition, like the philologist's, is pure=20 lexicography, affirming a relationship of synonymy antecedent to the = exposition in hand.

Just what it means to affirm synonymy, just what the = interconnections=20 may be which are necessary and sufficient in order that two = linguistic forms=20 be properly describable as synonymous, is far from clear; but, = whatever=20 these interconnections may be, ordinarily they are grounded in = usage.=20 Definitions reporting selected instances of synonymy come then as = reports=20 upon usage.

There is also, however, a variant type of definitional = activity which=20 does not limit itself to the reporting of pre-existing synonymies. I = have in=20 mind what Carnap calls explication -- an = activity to=20 which philosophers are given, and scientists also in their more=20 philosophical moments. In explication the purpose is not merely to=20 paraphrase the definiendum into an outright synonym, but actually to = improve=20 upon the definiendum by refining or supplementing its meaning. But = even=20 explication, though not merely reporting a pre-existing synonymy = between=20 definiendum and definiens, does rest nevertheless on=20 other pre-existing synonymies. The matter may = bc viewed=20 as follows. Any word worth explicating has some contexts which, as = wholes,=20 are clear and precise enough to be useful; and the purpose of = explication is=20 to preserve the usage of these favored contexts while sharpening the = usage=20 of other contexts. In order that a given definition be suitable for = purposes=20 of explication, therefore, what is required is not that the = definiendum in=20 its antecedent usage be synonymous with the definiens, but just that = each of=20 these favored contexts of the definiendum taken as a whole in its = antecedent=20 usage, be synonymous with the corresponding context of the = definiens.=20

Two alternative definientia may be equally appropriate for the = purposes of a given task of explication and yet not be synonymous = with each=20 other; for they may serve interchangeably within the favored = contexts but=20 diverge elsewhere. By cleaving to one of these definientia rather = than the=20 other, a definition of explicative kind generates, by fiat, a = relationship=20 of synonymy between definiendum and definiens which did not hold = before. But=20 such a definition still owes its explicative function, as seen, to=20 pre-existing synonymies.

There does, however, remain still an extreme sort of = definition which=20 does not hark back to prior synonymies at all; namely, the = explicitly=20 conventional introduction of novel notations for purposes of sheer=20 abbreviation. Here the definiendum becomes synonymous with the = definiens=20 simply because it has been created expressly for the purpose of = being=20 synonymous with the definiens. Here we have a really transparent = case of=20 synonymy created by definition; would that all species of synonymy = were as=20 intelligible. For the rest, definition rests on synonymy rather than = explaining it.

The word "definition" has come to have a dangerously = reassuring sound,=20 due no doubt to its frequent occurrence in logical and mathematical=20 writings. We shall do well to digress now into a brief appraisal of = the role=20 of definition in formal work.

In logical and mathematical systems either of two mutually=20 antagonistic types of economy may be striven for, and each has its = peculiar=20 practical utility. On the one hand we may seek economy of practical=20 expression: ease and brevity in the statement of multifarious = relationships.=20 This sort of economy calls usually for distinctive concise notations = for a=20 wealth of concepts. Second, however, and oppositely, we may seek = economy in=20 grammar and vocabulary; we may try to find a minimum of basic = concepts such=20 that, once a distinctive notation has been appropriated to each of = them, it=20 becomes possible to express any desired further concept by mere = combination=20 and iteration of our basic notations. This second sort of economy is = impractical in one way, since a poverty in basic idioms tends to a = necessary=20 lengthening of discourse. But it is practical in another way: it = greatly=20 simplifies theoretical discourse about the = language,=20 through minimizing the terms and the forms of construction wherein = the=20 language consists.

Both sorts of economy, though prima facie incompatible, are = valuable=20 in their separate ways. The custom has consequently arisen of = combining both=20 sorts of economy by forging in effect two languages, the one a part = of the=20 other. The inclusive language, though redundant in grammar and = vocabulary,=20 is economical in message lengths, while the part, called = primitive=20 notation, is economical in grammar and vocabulary. Whole = and part=20 are correlated by rules of translation whereby each idiom not in = primitive=20 notation is equated to some complex built up of primitive notation. = These=20 rules of translation are the so-called = definitions=20 which appear in formalized systems. They are best viewed not as = adjuncts to=20 one language but as correlations between two languages, the one a = part of=20 the other.

But these correlations are not arbitrary. They are supposed to = show=20 how the primitive notations can accomplish all purposes, save = brevity and=20 convenience, of the redundant language. Hence the definiendum and = its=20 definiens may be expected, in each case, to bc related in one or = another of=20 the three ways lately noted. The definiens may be a faithful = paraphrase of=20 the definiendum into the narrower notation, preserving a direct = synonymy as=20 of antecedent usage; or the definiens may, in the spirit of = explication,=20 improve upon the antecedent usage of the definiendum; or finally, = the=20 definiendum may be a newly created notation, newly endowed with = meaning here=20 and now.

In formal and informal work alike, thus, we find that = definition --=20 except in the extreme case of the explicitly conventional = introduction of=20 new notation -- hinges on prior relationships of synonymy. = Recognizing then=20 that the notation of definition does not hold the key to synonymy = and=20 analyticity, let us look further into synonymy and say no more of=20 definition.

III. INTERCHANGEABILITY

A natural suggestion, deserving close examination, is that the = synonymy of two linguistic forms consists simply in their = interchangeability=20 in all contexts without change of truth value; interchangeability, = in=20 Leibniz's phrase, salva veritate.^2a Note that synonyms so conceived need not = even be=20 free from vagueness, as long as the vaguenesses match.

But it is not quite true that the synonyms 'bachelor' and = 'unmarried=20 man' are everywhere interchangeable salva = veritate.=20 Truths which become false under substitution of 'unmarried man' for=20 'bachelor' are easily constructed with help of 'bachelor of arts' or = 'bachelor's buttons.' Also with help of quotation, thus:

'Bachelor' has less than ten letters.

Such counterinstances can, however, perhaps be set aside by = treating=20 the phrases 'bachelor of arts' and 'bachelor's buttons' and the = quotation=20 "bachelor" each as a single indivisible word and then stipulating = that the=20 interchangeability salva veritate which is to = be the=20 touchstone of synonymy is not supposed to apply to fragmentary = occurrences=20 inside of a word. This account of synonymy, supposing it acceptable = on other=20 counts, has indeed the drawback of appealing to a prior conception = of "word"=20 which can be counted on to present difficulties of formulation in = its turn.=20 Nevertheless some progress might be claimed in having reduced the = problem of=20 synonymy to a problem of wordhood. Let us pursue this line a bit, = taking=20 "word" for granted.

The question remains whether interchangeability = salva=20 veritate (apart from occurrences within words) is a = strong enough=20 condition for synonymy, or whether, on the contrary, some = non-synonymous=20 expressions might be thus interchangeable. Now let us be clear that = we are=20 not concerned here with synonymy in the sense of complete identity = in=20 psychological associations or poetic quality; indeed no two = expressions are=20 synonymous in such a sense. We are concerned only with what may be = called=20 cognitive synonymy. Just what this is cannot be = said=20 without successfully finishing the present study; but we know = something=20 about it from the need which arose for it in connection with = analyticity in=20 Section=20 1. The sort of synonymy needed there was merely such that = any=20 analytic statement could be turned into a logical truth by putting = synonyms=20 for synonyms. Turning the tables and assuming analyticity, indeed, = we could=20 explain cognitive synonymy of terms as follows (keeping to the = familiar=20 example): to say that 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are cognitively = synonymous is to say no more nor less than that the statement: =

(3) All and only bachelors are unmarried = men

is analytic.³

What we need is an account of cognitive synonymy not = presupposing=20 analyticity -- if we are to explain analyticity conversely with help = of=20 cognitive synonymy as undertaken in Section=20 1. And indeed such an independent account of cognitive = synonymy=20 is at present up for consideration, namely, interchangeability=20 salva veritate everywhere except within words. = The=20 question before us, to resume the thread at last, is whether such=20 interchangeability is a sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy. = We can=20 quickly assure ourselves that it is, by examples of the following = sort. The=20 statement:

(4) Necessarily all and only bachelors are=20 bachelors

is evidently true, even supposing 'necessarily' so narrowly = construed=20 as to be truly applicable only to analytic statements. Then,=20 if 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are = interchangeable=20 salva veritate, the result

(5) Necessarily, all and only bachelors are unmarried men=20

of putting 'unmarried man' for an occurrence of 'bachelor' in = (4)=20 must, like (4),=20 be true. But to say that (5)=20 is true is to say that (3)=20 is analytic, and hence that 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are = cognitively=20 synonymous.

Let us see what there is about the above argument that gives = it its=20 air of hocus-pocus. The condition of interchangeability = salva=20 veritate varies in its force with variations in the = richness of=20 the language at hand. The above argument supposes we are working = with a=20 language rich enough to contain the adverb 'necessarily,' this = adverb being=20 so construed as to yield truth when and only when applied to an = analytic=20 statement. But can we condone a language which contains such an = adverb? Does=20 the adverb really make sense? To suppose that it does is to suppose = that we=20 have already made satisfactory sense of 'analytic.' Then what are we = so hard=20 at work on right now?

Our argument is not flatly circular, but something like it. It = has the=20 form, figuratively speaking, of a closed curve in space.

Interchangeability salva veritate is = meaningless=20 until relativized to a language whose extent is specified in = relevant=20 respects. Suppose now we consider a language containing just the = following=20 materials. There is an indefinitely large stock of one- and = many-place=20 predicates, mostly having to do with extralogical subject matter. = The rest=20 of the language is logical. The atomic sentences consist each of a = predicate=20 followed by one or more variables; and the complex sentences are = built up of=20 atomic ones by truth functions and quantification. In effect such a = language=20 enjoys the benefits also of descriptions and class names and indeed = singular=20 terms generally, these being contextually definable in known = ways.⁴ Such a language can be adequate to = classical=20 mathematics and indeed to scientific discourse generally, except in = so far=20 as the latter involves debatable devices such as modal adverbs and=20 contrary-to-fact conditionals. Now a language of this type is=20 extensional, in this sense: any two predicates = which=20 agree extensionally (i.e., are true of the same = objects) are interchangeable salva veritate. =

In an extensional language, therefore, interchangeability=20 salva veritate is no assurance of cognitive = synonymy of=20 the desired type. That 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are = interchangeable=20 salva veritate in an extensional language = assures us of=20 no more than that (3)=20 is true. There is no assurance here that the extensional agreement = of=20 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' rests on meaning rather than merely = on=20 accidental matters of fact, as does extensional agreement of = 'creature with=20 a heart' and 'creature with a kidney.'

For most purposes extensional agreement is the nearest = approximation=20 to synonymy we need care about. But the fact remains that = extensional=20 agreement falls far short of cognitive synonymy of the type required = for=20 explaining analyticity in the manner of Section=20 I. The type of cognitive synonymy required there is such = as to=20 equate the synonymy of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' with the = analyticity=20 of (3),=20 not merely with the truth of (3).=20

So we must recognize that interchangeability salva=20 veritate, if construed in relation to an extensional = language, is=20 not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy in the sense needed = for=20 deriving analyticity in the manner of Section=20 I. If a language contains an intensional adverb = 'necessarily' in=20 the sense lately noted, or other particles to the same effect, then=20 interchangeability salva veritate in such a = language=20 does afford a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such a = language is intelligible only if the notion of analyticity is = already=20 clearly understood in advance.

The effort to explain cognitive synonymy first, for the sake = of=20 deriving analyticity from it afterward as in Section=20 I, is perhaps the wrong approach. Instead we might try = explaining=20 analyticity somehow without appeal to cognitive synonymy. Afterward = we could=20 doubtless derive cognitive synonymy from analyticity satisfactorily = enough=20 if desired. We have seen that cognitive synonymy of 'bachelor' and=20 'unmarried man' can be explained as analyticity of (3).=20 The same explanation works for any pair of one-place predicates, of = course,=20 and it can be extended in obvious fashion to many-place predicates. = Other=20 syntactical categories can also he accommodated in fairly parallel = fashion.=20 Singular terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous when the = statement=20 of identity formed by putting '=3D' between them is analytic. = Statements may=20 be said simply to be cognitively synonymous when their biconditional = (the=20 result of joining them by 'if and only if') is analytic.⁵ If we care to lump all categories into a = single=20 formulation, at the expense of assuming again the notion of "word" = which was=20 appealed to early in this section, we can describe any two = linguistic forms=20 as cognitively synonymous when the two forms are interchangeable = (apart from=20 occurrences within "words") salva (no longer=20 veritate but) = analyticitate.=20 Certain technical questions arise, indeed, over cases of ambiguity = or=20 homonymy; let us not pause for them, however, for we are already = digressing.=20 Let us rather turn our backs on the problem of synonymy and address=20 ourselves anew to that of analyticity.

IV. SEMANTICAL RULES

Analyticity at first seemed most naturally definable by appeal = to a=20 realm of meanings. On refinement, the appeal to meanings gave way to = an=20 appeal to synonymy or definition. But definition turned out to be a=20 will-o'-the-wisp, and synonymy turned out to be best understood only = by dint=20 of a prior appeal to analyticity itself. So we are back at the = problem of=20 analyticity.

I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is = extended' is=20 analytic. Now does my indecision over this example really betray an=20 incomplete understanding, an incomplete grasp of the "meanings," of = 'green'=20 and 'extended'? I think not. The trouble is not with 'green' or = 'extended,'=20 but with 'analytic.'

It is often hinted that the difficulty in separating analytic=20 statements from synthetic ones in ordinary language is due to the = vagueness=20 of ordinary language and that the distinction is clear when we have = a=20 precise artificial language with explicit "semantical rules." This, = however,=20 as I shall now attempt to show, is a confusion.

The notion of analyticity about which we are worrying is a = purported=20 relation between statements and languages: a statement S is said to = be=20 analytic for a language L, and the problem is = to make=20 sense of this relation generally, for example, for variable 'S' and = 'L.' The=20 point that I want to make is that the gravity of this problem is not = perceptibly less for artificial languages than for natural ones. The = problem=20 of making sense of the idiom 'S is analytic for = L,'=20 with variable 'S' and 'L,' retains its stubbornness even if we limit = the=20 range of the variable 'L' to artificial languages. Let me now try to = make=20 this point evident.

For artificial languages and semantical rules we look = naturally to the=20 writings of Carnap. His semantical rules take various forms, and to = make my=20 point I shall have to distinguish certain of the forms. Let us = suppose, to=20 begin with, an artificial language L₀ whose = semantical rules have the form explicitly of a specification, by = recursion=20 or otherwise, of all the analytic statements of = L₀.=20 The rules tell us that such and such statements, and only those, are = the=20 analytic statements of L₀. Now here the = difficulty=20 is simply that the rules contain the word 'analytic,' which we do = not=20 understand! We understand what expressions the rules attribute = analyticity=20 to, but we do not understand what the rules attribute to those = expressions.=20 In short, before we can understand a rule which begins "A statement = S is=20 analytic for language L₀ if and only if . . = . ," we=20 must understand the general relative term 'analytic for'; we must = understand=20 'S is analytic for L' where 'S' and 'L' are variables.

Alternatively we may, indeed, view the so-called rule as a=20 conventional definition of a new simple symbol=20 'analytic-for-L₀,' which might better be = written=20 untendentiously as 'K' so as not to seem to throw light on the = interesting=20 word "analytic." Obviously any number of classes K, M, N, etc., of=20 statements of L₀ can be specified for = various=20 purposes or for no purpose; what does it mean to say that K, as = against M,=20 N, etc., is the class of the 'analytic' statements of=20 L₀?

By saying what statements are analytic for = L₀=20 we explain 'analytic-for L₀ ' but not = 'analytic=20 for.' We do not begin to explain the idiom 'S is analytic for L' = with=20 variable 'S' and 'L,' even though we be content to limit the range = of 'L' to=20 the realm of artificial languages.

Actually we do know enough about the intended significance of=20 'analytic' to know that analytic statements are supposed to be true. = Let us=20 then turn to a second form of semantical rule, which says not that = such and=20 such statements are analytic but simply that such and such = statements are=20 included among the truths. Such a rule is not subject to the = criticism of=20 containing the un-understood word 'analytic'; and we may grant for = the sake=20 of argument that there is no difficulty over the broader term = 'true.' A=20 semantical rule of this second type, a rule of truth, is not = supposed to=20 specify all the truths of the language; it merely stipulates, = recursively or=20 otherwise, a certain multitude of statements which, along with = others=20 unspecified, are to count as true. Such a rule may be conceded to be = quite=20 clear. Derivatively, afterward, analyticity can be demarcated thus: = a=20 statement is analytic if it is (not merely true but) true according = to the=20 semantical rule.

Still there is really no progress. Instead of appealing to an=20 unexplained word 'analytic,' we are now appealing to an unexplained = phrase=20 'semantical rule.' Not every true statement which says that the = statements=20 of some class are true can count as a semantical rule -- otherwise = all=20 truths would be "analytic" in the sense of being true according to=20 semantical rules. Semantical rules are distinguishable, apparently, = only by=20 the fact of appearing on a page under the heading 'Semantical = Rules'; and=20 this heading is itself then meaningless.

We can say indeed that a statement is=20 analytic-for-L₀ if and = only if=20 it is true according to such and such specifically appended = "semantical=20 rules," but then we find ourselves back at essentially the same case = which=20 was originally discussed: 'S is = analytic-for-L₀ if=20 and only if. . . .' Once we seek to explain 'S is analytic for L' = generally=20 for variable 'L' ( even allowing limitation of 'L' to artificial = languages=20 ), the explanation 'true according to the semantical rules of L' is=20 unavailing; for the relative term 'semantical rule of' is as much in = need of=20 clarification, at least, as 'analytic for.'

It may be instructive to compare the notion of semantical = rule with=20 that of postulate. Relative to the given set of postulates, it is = easy to=20 say that what a postulate is: it is a member of the set. Relative = to a=20 given set of semantical rules, it is equally easy to say what a = semantical=20 rule is. But given simply a notation, mathematical or otherwise, = and=20 indeed as thoroughly understood a notation as you please in point = of the=20 translation or truth conditions of its statements, who can say = which of=20 its true statements rank as postulates? Obviously the question is=20 meaningless -- as meaningless as asking which points in Ohio are = starting=20 points. Any finite (or effectively specifiable infinite) selection = of=20 statements (preferably true ones, perhaps) is as much=20 a set of postulates as any other. The word=20 'postulate' is significant only relative to an act of inquiry; we = apply=20 the word to a set of statements just in so far as we happen, for = the year=20 or the argument, to be thinking of those statements which can be = reached=20 from them by some set of trasformations to which we have seen fit = to=20 direct our attention. Now the notion of semantical rule is as = sensible and=20 meaningful as that of postulate, if conceived in a similarly = relative=20 spirit -- relative, this time, to one or another particular = enterprise of=20 schooling unconversant persons in sufficient conditions for truth = of=20 statements of some natural or artificial language L. But from this = point=20 of view no one signalization of a subclass of the truths of L is=20 intrinsically more a semantical rule than another; and, if = 'analytic'=20 means 'true by semantical rules', no one truth of L is analytic to = the=20 exclusion of another.^5a

It might conceivably be protested that an artificial = language L=20 (unlike a natural one) is a language in the ordinary sense=20 plus a set of explicit semantical rules -- = the whole=20 constituting, let us say, an ordered pair; and that the semantical = rules=20 of L then are specifiable simply as the second component of the = pair L.=20 But, by the same token and more simply, we might construe an = artificial=20 language L outright as an ordered pair whose second component is = the class=20 of its analytic statements; and then the analytic statements of L = become=20 specifiable simply as the statements in the second component of L. = Or=20 better still, we might just stop tugging at our bootstraps = altogether.=20
Not all the explanations of analyticity known to Carnap and = his=20 readers have been covered explicitly in the above considerations, = but the=20 extension to other forms is not hard to see. Just one additional = factor=20 should be mentioned which sometimes enters: sometimes the = semantical rules=20 are in effect rules of translation into ordinary language, in = which case=20 the analytic statements of the artificial language are in effect=20 recognized as such from the analyticity of their specified = translations in=20 ordinary language. Here certainly there can be no thought of an=20 illumination of the problem of analyticity from the side of the = artificial=20 language.
From the point of view of the problem of analyticity the = notion of=20 an artificial language with semantical rules is a feu = follet par=20 ercellence. Semantical rules determining the analytic=20 statements of an artificial language are of interest only in so = far as we=20 already understand the notion of analyticity; they are of no help = in=20 gaining this understanding.
Appeal to hypothetical languages of an artificially simple = kind=20 could conceivably bc useful in clarifying analyticity, if the = mental or=20 behavioral or cultural factors relevant to analyticity -- whatever = they=20 may be -- were somehow sketched into the simplified model. But a = model=20 which takes analyticity merely as an irreducible character is = unlikely to=20 throw light on the problem of explicating analyticity.
It is obvious that truth in general depends on both = language and=20 extra-linguistic fact. The statement 'Brutus killed Caesar' would = be false=20 if the world had been different in certain ways, but it would also = be=20 false if the word 'killed' happened rather to have the sense of = 'begat.'=20 Hence the temptation to suppose in general that the truth of a = statement=20 is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual = component.=20 Given this supposition, it next seems reasonable that in some = statements=20 the factual component should be null; and these are the analytic=20 statements. But, for all its a priori = reasonableness,=20 a boundary between analytic and synthetic statement simply has not = been=20 drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an=20 unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith. =

V. THE VERIFICATION THEORY AND REDUCTIONISM =

In the course of these somber reflections we have taken a = dim view=20 first of the notion of meaning, then of the notion of cognitive = synonymy:=20 and finally of the notion of analyticity. But what, it may be = asked, of=20 the verification theory of meaning? This phrase has established = itself so=20 firmly as a catchword of empiricism that we should be very = unscientific=20 indeed not to look beneath it for a possible key to the problem of = meaning=20 and the associated problems.
The verification theory of meaning, which has been = conspicuous in=20 the literature from Peirce onward, is that the meaning of a = statement is=20 the method of empirically confirming or infirming it. An analytic=20 statement is that limiting case which is confirmed no matter what. =
As urged in Section=20 I, we can as well pass over the question of meanings as = entities and move straight to sameness of meaning, or synonymy. = Then what=20 the verification theory says is that statements are synonymous if = and only=20 if they are alike in point of method of empirical confirmation or=20 infirmation.
This is an account of cognitive synonymy not of linguistic = forms=20 generally, but of statements.⁶ However, from the concept of synonymy of = statements=20 we could derive the concept of synonymy for other linguistic = forms, by=20 considerations somewhat similar to those at the end of Section=20 III. Assuming the notion of "word," indeed, we could = explain=20 any two forms as synonymous when the putting of the one form for = an=20 occurrence of the other in any statement (apart from occurrences = within=20 "words") yields a synonymous statement. Finally, given the concept = of=20 synonymy thus for linguistic forms generally, we could define = analyticity=20 in terms of synonymy and logical truth as in Section=20 I. For that matter, we could define analyticity more = simply in=20 terms of just synonymy of statements together with logical truth; = it is=20 not necessary to appeal to synonymy of linguistic forms other than = statements. For a statement may be described as analytic simply = when it is=20 synonymous with a logically true statement.
So, if the verification theory can be accepted as an = adequate=20 account of statement synonymy, the notion of analyticity is saved = after=20 all. However, let us reflect. Statement synonymy is said to be = likeness of=20 method of empirical confirmation or infirmation. Just what are = these=20 methods which are to be compared for likeness? What, in other = words, is=20 the nature of the relationship between a statement and the = experiences=20 which contribute to or detract from its confirmation?
The most naive view of the relationship is that it is one = of direct=20 report. This is radical reductionism. Every=20 meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement = (true or=20 false) about immediate experience. Radical reductionism, in one = form or=20 another, well antedates the verification theory of meaning = explicitly so=20 called. Thus Locke and Hume held that every idea must either = originate=20 directly in sense experience or else be compounded of ideas thus=20 originating; and taking a hint from Tooke⁷ we might rephrase this doctrine in = semantical=20 jargon by saying that a term, to be significant at all, must be = either a=20 name of a sense datum or a compound of such names or an = abbreviation of=20 such a compound. So stated, the doctrine remains ambiguous as = between=20 sense data as sensory events and sense data as sensory qualities; = and it=20 remains vague as to the admissible ways of compounding. Moreover, = the=20 doctrine is unnecessarily and intolerably restrictive in the = term-by-term=20 critique which it imposes. More reasonably, and without yet = exceeding the=20 limits of what I have called radical reductionism, we may take = full=20 statements as our significant units -- thus demanding that our = statements=20 as wholes be translatable into sense-datum language, but not that = they be=20 translatable term by term.
This emendation would unquestionably have been welcome to = Locke and=20 Hume and Tooke, but historically it had to await two intermediate=20 developments. One of these developments was the increasing = emphasis on=20 verification or confirmation, which came with the explicitly = so-called=20 verification theory of meaning. The objects of verification or=20 confirmation being statements, this emphasis gave the statement an = ascendancy over the word or term as unit of significant discourse. = The=20 other development, consequent upon the first, was Russell's = discovery of=20 the concept of incomplete symbols defined in use.
Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as = units, sets=20 itself the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing = how to=20 translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by = statement, into=20 it. Carnap embarked on this project in the=20 Aufbau.⁸
The language which Carnap adopted as his starting point was = not a=20 sense-datum language in the narrowest conceivable sense, for it = included=20 also the notations of logic, up through higher set theory. In = effect it=20 included the whole language of pure mathematics. The ontology = implicit in=20 it (i.e., the range of values of its variables) embraced not only = sensory=20 events but classes, classes of classes, and so on. Empiricists = there are=20 who would boggle at such prodigality. Carnap's starting point is = very=20 parsimonious, however, in its extralogical or sensory part. In a = series of=20 constructions in which he exploits the resources of modern logic = with much=20 ingenuity, he succeeds in defining a wide array of important = additional=20 sensory concepts which, but for his constructions, one would not = have=20 dreamed were definable on so slender a basis. Carnap was the first = empiricist who, not content with asserting the reducibility of = science to=20 terms of immediate experience, took serious steps toward carrying = out the=20 reduction.
Even supposing Carnap's starting point satisfactory, his=20 constructions were, as he himself stressed, only a fragment of the = full=20 program. The construction of even the simplest statements about = the=20 physical world was left in a sketchy state. Carnap's suggestions = on this=20 subject were, despite their sketchiness, very suggestive. He = explained=20 spatio-temporal point-instants as quadruples of real numbers and = envisaged=20 assignment of sense qualities to point-instants according to = certain=20 canons. Roughly summarized, the plan was that qualities should be = assigned=20 to point-instants in such a way as to achieve the laziest world = compatible=20 with our experience. The principle of least action was to be our = guide in=20 constructing a world from experience.
Carnap did not seem to recognize, however, that his = treatment of=20 physical objects fell short of reduction not merely through = sketchiness,=20 but in principle. Statements of the form 'Quality = q=20 is at point-instant x; y; z; t' were, = according to=20 his canons, to be apportioned truth values in such a way as to = maximize=20 and minimize certain over-all features, and with growth of = experience the=20 truth values were to be progressively revised in the same spirit. = I think=20 this is a good schematization (deliberately oversimplified, to be = sure) of=20 what science really does; but it provides no indication, not even = the=20 sketchiest, of how a statement of the form 'Quality = q=20 is at x; y; z; t' could ever be translated = into=20 Carnap's initial language of sense data and logic. The connective = 'is at'=20 remains an added undefined connective; the canons counsel us in = its use=20 but not in its elimination.
Carnap seems to have appreciated this point afterward; for = in his=20 later writings he abandoned all notion of the translatability of=20 statements about the physical world into statements about = immediate=20 experience. Reductionism in its radical form has long since ceased = to=20 figure in Carnap's philosophy.
But the dogma of reductionism has, in a subtler and more = tenuous=20 form, continued to influence the thought of empiricists. The = notion=20 lingers that to each statement, or each synthetic statement, there = is=20 associated a unique range of possible sensory events such that the = occurrence of any of them would add to the likelihood of truth of = the=20 statement, and that there is associated also another unique range = of=20 possible sensory events whose occurrence would detract from that=20 likelihood. This notion is of course implicit in the verification = theory=20 of meaning.
The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that = each=20 statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of = confirmation=20 or infirmation at all. My countersuggestion, issuing essentially = from=20 Carnap's doctrine of the physical world in the=20 Aufbau, is that our statements about the = external=20 world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but = only as a=20 corporate body.
The dogma of reductionism, even in its attenuated form, is=20 intimately connected with the other dogma: that there is a = cleavage=20 between the analytic and the synthetic. We have found ourselves = led,=20 indeed, from the latter problem to the former through the = verification=20 theory of meaning. More directly, the one dogma clearly supports = the other=20 in this way: as long as it is taken to be significant in general = to speak=20 of the confirmation and infirmation of a statement, it seems = significant=20 to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously=20 confirmed, ipso facto, come what may; and = such a=20 statement is analytic.
The two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical. We lately = reflected=20 that in general the truth of statements does obviously depend both = upon=20 extra-linguistic fact; and we noted that this obvious circumstance = carries=20 in its train, not logically but all too naturally, a feeling that = the=20 truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic = component and=20 a factual component. The factual component must, if we are = empiricists,=20 boil down to a range of confirmatory experiences. In the extreme = case=20 where the linguistic component is all that matters, a true = statement is=20 analytic. But I hope we are now impressed with how stubbornly the=20 distinction between analytic and synthetic has resisted any=20 straightforward drawing. I am impressed also, apart from = prefabricated=20 examples of black and white balls in an urn, with how baffling the = problem=20 has always been of arriving at any explicit theory of the = empirical=20 confirmation of a synthetic statement. My present suggestion is = that it is=20 nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic=20 component and a factual component in the truth of any individual=20 statement. Taken collectively, science has its double dependence = upon=20 language and experience; but this duality is not significantly = traceable=20 into the statements of science taken one by one.
Russell's concept of definition in use was, as remarked, an = advance=20 over the impossible term-by-term empiricism of Locke and Hume. The = statement, rather than the term, came with Russell to be = recognized as the=20 unit accountable to an empiricist critique. But what I am now = urging is=20 that even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn our grid = too=20 finely. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of = science.

VI. EMPIRICISM WITHOUT THE DOGMAS

The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from = the most=20 casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of = atomic=20 physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made = fabric which=20 impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the = figure,=20 total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions = are=20 experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions=20 readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to = be=20 redistributed over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some=20 statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their = logical=20 interconnections -- the logical laws being in turn simply certain = further=20 statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. = Having=20 re-evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, = whether they=20 be statements logically connected with the first or whether they = be the=20 statements of logical connections themselves. But the total field = is so=20 undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is = much=20 latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the = light of=20 any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are = linked with=20 any particular statements in the interior of the field, except = indirectly=20 through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a = whole.
If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the = empirical=20 content of an individual statement -- especially if it be a = statement at=20 all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. = Furthermore it=20 becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, = which hold=20 contingently on experience, and analytic statements which hold = come what=20 may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make = drastic=20 enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very = close to=20 the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant = experience by=20 pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the = kind=20 called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement = is immune=20 to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded = middle has=20 been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and = what=20 difference is there in principle between such a shift and the = shift=20 whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin=20 Aristotle?
For vividness I have been speaking in terms of varying = distances=20 from a sensory periphery. Let me try now to clarify this notion = without=20 metaphor. Certain statements, though about physical objects and = not sense=20 experience, seem peculiarly germane to sense experience -- and in = a=20 selective way: some statements to some experiences, others to = others. Such=20 statements, especially germane to particular experiences, I = picture as=20 near the periphery. But in this relation of "germaneness" I = envisage=20 nothing more than a loose association reflecting the relative = likelihood,=20 in practice, of our choosing one statement rather than another for = revision in the event of recalcitrant experience. For example, we = can=20 imagine recalcitrant experiences to which we would surely be = inclined to=20 accommodate our system by re-evaluating just the statement that = there are=20 brick houses on Elm Street, together with related statements on = the same=20 topic. We can imagine other recalcitrant experiences to which we = would be=20 inclined to accommodate our system by re-evaluating just the = statement=20 that there are no centaurs, along with kindred statements. A = recalcitrant=20 experience can, I have already urged, bc accommodated by any of = various=20 alternative re-evaluations in various alternative quarters of the = total=20 system; but, in the cases which we are now imagining, our natural = tendency=20 to disturb the total system as little as possible would lead us to = focus=20 our revisions upon these specific statements concerning brick = houses or=20 centaurs. These statements are felt, therefore, to have a sharper=20 empirical reference than highly theoretical statements of physics = or logic=20 or ontology. The latter statements may be thought of as relatively = centrally located within the total network, meaning merely that = little=20 preferential connection with any particular sense data obtrudes = itself.=20
As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual = scheme of=20 science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in = the=20 light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually = imported into=20 the situation as convenient intermediaries -- not by definition in = terms=20 of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable,=20 epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. Let me interject that for = my part=20 I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in = Homer's=20 gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. = But in=20 point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods = differ=20 only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our=20 conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects = is=20 epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more = efficacious=20 than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure = into the=20 flux of experience.
Imagine, for the sake of analogy, that we are given the = rational=20 numbers. We develop an algebraic theory for reasoning about them, = but we=20 find it inconveniently complex, because certain functions such as = square=20 root lack values for some arguments. Then it is discovered that = the rules=20 of our algebra can be much simplified by conceptually augmenting = our=20 ontology with some mythical entities, to be called irrational = numbers. All=20 we continue to be really interested in, first and last, are = rational=20 numbers; but we find that we can commonly get from one law about = rational=20 numbers to another much more quickly and simply by pretending that = the=20 irrational numbers are there too.
I think this a fair account of the introduction of = irrational=20 numbers and other extensions of the number system. The fact that = the=20 mythical status of irrational numbers eventually gave way to the = Dedekind-=20 Russell version of them as certain infinite classes of ratios is=20 irrelevant to my analogy. That version is impossible anyway as = long as=20 reality is limited to the rational numbers and not extended to = classes of=20 them.
Now I suggest that experience is analogous to the rational = numbers=20 and that the physical objects, in analogy to the irrational = numbers, are=20 posits which serve merely to simplify our treatment of experience. = The=20 physical objects are no more reducible to experience than the = irrational=20 numbers to rational numbers, but their incorporation into the = theory=20 enables us to get more easily from one statement about experience = to=20 another.
The salient differences between the positing of physical = objects=20 and the positing of irrational numbers are, I think, just two. = First, the=20 factor of simplication is more overwhelming in the case of = physical=20 objects than in the numerical case. Second, the positing of = physical=20 objects is far more archaic, being indeed coeval, I expect, with = language=20 itself. For language is social and so depends for its development = upon=20 intersubjective reference.
Positing does not stop with macroscopic physical objects. = Objects=20 at the atomic level and beyond are posited to make the laws of = macroscopic=20 objects, and ultimately the laws of experience, simpler and more=20 manageable; and we need not expect or demand full definition of = atomic and=20 subatomic entities in terms of macroscopic ones, any more than = definition=20 of macroscopic things in terms of sense data. Science is a = continuation of=20 common sense, and it continues the common-sense expedient of = swelling=20 ontology to simplify theory.
Physical objects, small and large, are not the only posits. = Forces=20 are another example; and indeed we are told nowadays that the = boundary=20 between energy and matter is obsolete. Moreover, the abstract = entities=20 which are the substance of mathematics -- ultimately classes and = classes=20 of classes and so on up -- are another posit in the same spirit.=20 Epistemologically these are myths on the same footing with = physical=20 objects and gods, neither better nor worse except for differences = in the=20 degree to which they expedite our dealings with sense experiences. =
The over-all algebra of rational and irrational numbers is=20 underdetermined by the algebra of rational numbers, but is = smoother and=20 more convenient; and it includes the algebra of rational numbers = as a=20 jagged or gerrymandered part. Total science, mathematical and = natural and=20 human, is similarly but more extremely underdetermined by = experience. The=20 edge of the system must be kept squared with experience; the rest, = with=20 all its elaborate myths or fictions, has as its objective the = simplicity=20 of laws.
Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par with = questions=20 of natural science. Consider the question whether to countenance = classes=20 as entities. This, as I have argued elsewhere,⁹ is the question whether to quantify with = respect to=20 variables which take classes as values. Now Carnap has = maintained¹⁰ that this is a question not of matters = of fact but=20 of choosing a convenient language form, a convenient conceptual = scheme or=20 framework for science. With this I agree, but only on the proviso = that the=20 same be conceded regarding scientific hypotheses generally. Carnap = has=20 recognized¹¹ that he is able to preserve a double = standard for=20 ontological questions and scientific hypotheses only by assuming = an=20 absolute distinction between the analytic and the synthetic; and I = need=20 not say again that this is a distinction which I reject.
Some issues do, I grant, seem more a question of convenient = conceptual scheme and others more a question of brute fact. The = issue over=20 there being classes seems more a question of convenient conceptual = scheme;=20 the issue over there being centaurs, or brick houses on Elm = Street, seems=20 more a question of fact. But I have been urging that this = difference is=20 only one of degree, and that it turns upon our vaguely pragmatic=20 inclination to adjust one strand of the fabric of science rather = than=20 another in accommodating some particular recalcitrant experience.=20 Conservatism figures in such choices, and so does the quest for=20 simplicity.
Carnap, Lewis, and others take a pragmatic stand on the = question of=20 choosing between language forms, scientific frameworks; but their=20 pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the = analytic and=20 the synthetic. In repudiating such a boundary I espouse a more = thorough=20 pragmatism. Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a = continuing=20 barrage of sensory stimulation; and the considerations which guide = him in=20 warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sensory = promptings=20 are, where rational, pragmatic.

Notes

1. See White, "The Analytic and the = Synthetic:=20 An Untenable Dualism," John Dewey: Philosopher of = Science and=20 Freedom (New York: 1950), p. 324. [Back]=20

2. R. Carnap, Meaning and=20 Necessity (Chicago, 1947), pp. 9 ff.; Logical = Foundations of Probability (Chicago, 1950), pp. 70 ff. = [Back]=20

2a. According to an important = variant sense of=20 'definition', the relation preserved may be the weaker relation of = mere=20 agreement in reference. But, definition in this sense is better = ignored in=20 the present connection, being irrelevant to the question of = synonymy.=20 Added 1961. [Back]=20

3. This is cognitive synonymy in a = primary,=20 broad sense. Carnap (Meaning and Necessity, = pp. 56=20 ff.) and Lewis (Analysis of Knowledge and = Valuation=20 [La Salle, Ill., 1946], pp. 83 ff.) have suggested how, once this = notion=20 is at hand, a narrower sense of cognitive synonymy which is = preferable for=20 some purposes can in turn be derived. But this special = ramification of=20 concept-building lies aside from the present purposes and must not = be=20 confused with the broad sort of cognitive synonymy here concerned. = [Back]=20

4. See, for example my = Mathematical=20 Logic (New York, 1949; Cambridge, Mass., 1947), sec. = 24, 26,=20 27; or Methods of Logic (New York, 1950), = sec. 37 ff.=20 [Back]=20

5. The 'if and only if' itself is = intended in=20 the truth functional sense. See Carnap, Meaning and=20 Necessity, p. 14. [Back]=20

5a. Foregoing paragraph added in = 1961 in=20 response to R. M. Martin, "On 'analytic'," Philosophical = Studies 3 (1952): 42-47. [Back]=20

6. The doctrine can indeed be = formulated with=20 terms rather than statements as the units. Thus C. I. Lewis = describes the=20 meaning of a term as "a criterion in mind, by reference to which = one is=20 able to apply or refuse to apply the expression in question in the = case of=20 presented, or imagined things or situations" (Carnap, = Meaning=20 and Necessity, p. 133.). [Back]=20

7. John Horne Tooke, The = Diversions=20 of Purely (London, 1776; Boston, 1806), I, ch. ii. = [Back]=20

8. R. Carnap, Der logische = Aufbau der=20 Welt (Berlin, 1928). [Back]=20

9. For example, in "Notes on = Existence and=20 Necessity," Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1943), = 113-127. [Back]=20

10. Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, = and=20 Ontology," Revue internationale de = philosophie, 4=20 (1950), 20-40. [Back]=20

11. Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, = and=20 Ontology," p. 32. [Back]=20

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